Louisiana Law Review
Volume 29 | Number 3
April 1969

Hospital's Duty to Protect Mental Patient from
Suicide
Chester H. Budz Jr.

Repository Citation
Chester H. Budz Jr., Hospital's Duty to Protect Mental Patient from Suicide, 29 La. L. Rev. (1969)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol29/iss3/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

HOSPITAL'S DUTY TO PROTECT MENTAL PATIENT
FROM SUICIDE

In a California wrongful death action against defendant hospital for failing to take adequate precautions to prevent deceased,
a mental patient with known suicidal tendencies, from making a
fatal leap from a hospital window, the trial court instructed the
jury that if deceased's suicidal conduct was voluntary, defendant
could not be held liable. On appeal the California Supreme Court
in Vistica v. Presbyterian Hospital & Medical Center of San
Francisco'held this to be erroneous and remanded the controversy for a new trial. The opinion suggested, however, that the jury
should be instructed that it could deny recovery if it found that
decedent's voluntary conduct was "the responsible cause of her
death." Without attempting to speculate as to what the court
expected the jury to do with this rather ambiguous phrase, it is
difficult to grasp the full implication of the holding. Under the
facts of this case, it would be absurd to construe the holding to
mean that the defendant hospital could set up as a defense
against its own negligence the very condition that gave rise to
the hospital's duty in the first place-the mental incapacity and
suicidal tendencies of the decedent. The case, therefore, invites2
inquiry into the duty a private hospital owes to this type patient
and the effect of the patient's voluntary conduct on this duty.
Generally, the duty of a hospital is to exercise that degree of
reasonable care, skill, diligence, and protection used by other hospitals in the community. 3 The hospital must exercise such reason4
able care toward a patient as his known condition may require,
including reasonable care to safeguard the patient from dangers
resulting from his mental incapacity. 5 In this regard, hospitals
have been held liable for allowing a mentally ill patient to com6
mit suicide in such ways as drowning in a vat of boiling soap,
slashing his wrist or throat,7 leaping from windows,' taking poi1. 67 Cal.2d 471, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1967).
2. The defendant is a private hospital operated for profit. Such private hospitals, as opposed to charitable institutions, do not come under the doctrine of
charitable immunity to limit tort liability. Fowler v. Norways Sanitorium, 112
Ind. App. 347, 42 N.E.2d 415 (1942).
3. Birmingham Baptist Hiosp. v. Branton, 218 La. 464, 118 So. 741 (1928).
4. Wood v. Samaritan Institution, Inc., 26 Cal.2d 847, 161 P.2d 556 (1945).
5. Tate v. McCall Hosp., 57 Ga. App. 824, 196 S.E. 906 (1938) ; Brawner
v. Bussell, 50 Ga. App. 840, 179 S.E. 228 (1935).
6. Daley v. State, 273 App. Div. 552, 78 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1948).
7. Brawner v. Bussell, 50 Ga. App. 840, 179 S.E. 228 (1935).
8. Emory Univ. v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 643, 171 S.E. 192 (1933) ; Spivey
v. St. Thomas Hosp., 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450 (1947).
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son, 9 and hanging. 1 The hospital's knowledge or notice that the
patient was likely to harm himself and its subsequent failure to
take reasonable precautionary measures had consistently been
the determinative factor influencing courts and juries to impose
liability in these cases. 1
Liability has also been found where the hospital's negligence
in allowing a mentally deranged patient to escape resulted in
death caused by exposure to inclement weather, 12 a train" or
streetcar 4 accident or drowning. 15 In addition to considering
reasonable care after notice of elopement, the jury must examine
the broad question of whether the negligently allowed escape
was the proximate cause of death. Many cases absolve the hospital because of some later intervening force.
Notwithstanding those holdings which have imposed liability
on hospitals under the broad requirements of reasonable care, a
hospital is not an insurer of a patient's safety, and the standard
of care required is limited by the rule that no one is required to
guard against or take measures to avert that which reasonable
men under the circumstances would not anticipate as likely to
happen. 1" However, if the risk of harm is an appreciable one, as
it is in the case of a suicidal patient, the question of reasonable
anticipation is not one of mathematical probability alone. "As the
gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood
7
of its occurrence need be correspondingly less.'
In addition to the duty to take reasonable preventive measures after notice of a patient's tendency to harm himself, a hospital is also required to use reasonable care and skill to detect
a patient's tendencies toward self-destruction. s It is not necessary for the hospital to have had notice of the particular method
by which the accident might happen if its occurrence could have
9. Broz v. Omaha Maternity & Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 96 Neb. 648, 148 N.W. 575
(1914).
10. Smith v. Simpson, 221 Mo. App. 550, 288 S.W. 69 (1926); Dow v.
State, 183 Misc. 674, 50 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
11. Wood v. Samaritan Institution, Inc., 26 Cal.2d 847, 161 P.2d 556 (1945)
Edwards v. Grace Hlosp. Soc'y, 130 Conn. 568, 36 A.2d 273 (1944).
12. Burtman v. State, 188 Misc. 153, 67 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
13. Arlington Heights Sanitarium v. Deaderick, 272 S.W. 497 CTex. Civ.
App. 1925).
14. Phillips v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 211 Mo. 419, 111 S.W. 109 (1908).
15. Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc., 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81 (1934).
16. DeMartini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 442, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 564 (1961). See also Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal.2d 296,
163 P.2d 860 (1945).
17. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 222 (3d ed. 1964).
18. Ilignite's Adm'x v. Louisville Neuropathic Sanitorium, 233 Ky. 497, 4
S.W.2d 407 (1928) ; Maki v. Murray Hosp., 91 Mont. 251, 7 P.2d 228 (1932).
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been reasonably anticipated.19 It therefore follows that if a hospital has been put on guard as to a patient's suicidal tendencies
and as to his probable method of accomplishing his purpose (as
in the case where suicides or dangerous escapes have been attempted in a particular way in the past), the duty of the hospital
to protect and prevent is increased correspondingly.20
Thus, several factors are relevant in determining whether a
hospital exercised reasonable care under the circumstances to
prevent a mentally ill patient from committing suicide: (1)
knowledge or reasonable notice of suicidal tendencies or intent,
(2) anticipation of the method or instrumentality the patient
could be expected to utilize, (3) responsive or corrective measures the hospital takes to avert the reasonable consequences of
the patient's anticipated conduct, and (4) the risk of harm to
the patient that can be reasonably expected if the hospital fails
in its duty.
These factors assist the jury in deciding whether the hospital
was negligent in its care of the patient, but as to the final question of liability, there are other considerations. What effect, if
any, should the voluntary actions of a mentally ill patient under
the care and control of a hospital have upon the question of the
hospital's liability in suicide cases? As illustrated by the Vistica
case, the voluntary conduct of the patient can vitally effect the
question of defendant hospital's liability if the jury determines
that conduct to be the "responsible cause" of the death.
The exact inference to be drawn from this case is perhaps
only known to the court, but the decision does invite a consideration of the standard of care mental incompetents are required to
observe for their own protection. Cases considering this question
reflect the inclination of courts to deal with it in terms of contributory negligence as a bar to the insane plaintiff 's recovery.
This tendency seems at least questionable since many cases involve very intentional, well planned acts (suicide, escapes, etc.)
by the plaintiff, and not the customary failure to use reasonable
care for one's protection as in the usual contributory negligence
context. It is rather absurd to assert that plaintiff negligently
stole a razor blade and with it negligently slit his throat. Nevertheless, in light of the consistent application of contributory neg19. Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S. 150 (1913) ; Robert v. United States Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 240 N.Y. 474, 148 N.E. 650 (1925) ; Condran v.
Park & Tilford, 213 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E. 565 (1915) ; Spivey v. St. Thomas Hosp.,
31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450 (1947).
20. Paulen v. Shinnick, 291 Mich. 288, 289 N.W. 162 (1939).
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ligence terminology in the cases, an analysis of this area of the
law necessitates its continued use by the writer.
The early decisions considering the question adopted the very
conservative and sometimes harsh presumption that all persons
were responsible for conduct that would amount to contributory
negligence for the average, reasonable man unless it was shown
that at the time they were absolutely insane or completely devoid of intellect.1 The reason for the adoption of this presumption appears to be that the courts were reluctant to introduce
into the law the necessity of correlating the lesser degrees of insanity with the degree of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
There seems to be a small minority of courts today that still fol2
lows this line of cases . 2
This reluctance has been overcome in most jurisdictions today by submiting the question to the jury after introduction into
evidence of the facts pertaining to the plaintiff's particular type
of mental incapacity and his actions under the circumstances of
the case. The question of the effect of the plaintiff's mental condition upon his recovery is for the court to decide as a matter of
law only in those cases where reasonable men following the law
23
could come to no other conclusion.
There is unanimity among the cases on the proposition that
one who is completely insane or devoid of intelligence to the extent of being unable to appreciate a dangerous situation and
avoid exposure to it cannot be guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law.2 4 However, even among those states adopting
the more liberal approach of allowing lesser degrees of mental
incapacity to affect the jury's consideration, there is still some
disagreement as to the exact effect this should have on the issue
of whether plaintiff exercised reasonable care for his own protection. 25 The Restatement of Torts (Second) reflects the unset21. Johnson v. Texas & P. Ry., 16 La. App. 464, 133 So. 517 (2d Cir. 1931)
Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776 (1942).
22. See Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776 (1942);
Eckerd's Inc. v. McGhee, 19 Tenn. App. 277, 86 S.W.2d 570 (1935).
23. DeMartini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 442, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 564 (1961).
24. Johnson v. Texas & P. Ry., 16 La. App. 464, 133 So. 517 (2d Cir. 1931)
DeMartini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 442, 13 Cal. Rptr. 564
(1961) ; Emory Univ. v. Lee, 97 Ga. App. 680, 104 S.E.2d 234 (1958) ; Riesbeck
Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776 (1942) ; Noel v. McCaig,
174 Kan. 677, 258 P.2d 234 (1953) ; Hill v. Abram Smith & Son, 176 Mich. 151,
142 N.W. 565 (1913) ; Oliver v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 1018, 186 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Ct.
Cl. 1959).
25. See DeMartini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 442, 13
Cal. Rptr. 564 (1961) ; Emory Univ. v. Lee, 97 Ga. App. 680, 104 S.E.2d
234 (1958).
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tled character of this area of the law by expressing no opinion
as to whether insane persons are required to conform for their
own protection to the standard of conduct which society demands
26
of sane persons.
In those cases where the mentally ill plaintiff was under the
care and control of a hospital at the time of the accident, the distinction between absolute insanity and less severe mental illness,
as well as the disagreement as to its effect upon the degree of
care expected of the plaintiff appears less significant.2 7 These
cases place considerable emphasis upon the special duty relationship formed and tend to require a lower standard of care from
the patient for his own safety. However, since a hospital is not
an insurer, the patient is always required to exercise whatever
capacity he has for his own protection.2 8 Other than this somewhat more liberal approach when the patient-plaintiff is under
the care of a hospital, few generalizations can be deduced.
Thus, as the California Supreme Court expressed in the
Vistica case, in perhaps too succinct a manner, the jury has the
well-placed but difficult responsibility of weighing the patient's
capacity to protect himself with the hospital's concomitant duty
to guard the patient in determining the "responsible cause" of
the accident.
Chester H. Budz, Jr.

LOUISIANA LOAN LAWS
We are living in a society geared to a "buy-now-pay-later"
plan. Almost any consumer' can finance his goods and services
over an extended monthly payment plan. The financing of goods
and services is broadly categorized as consumer credit. The arrangement for extension of credit may be made by the consumer
with the person or organization providing the goods or furnishing the services or with some other entity which advances the
cash to the consumer to pay for such goods or services in return
for the consumer's promise to repay the advance. Consumer
26.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

27. See Lange v. United States, 179 F.

§ 464, caveat (1965).
Supp. 777 (N.D.N.Y. 1960; Emory

Univ. v. Lee, 97 Ga. App. 680, 104 S.E.2d 234 (1958) ; Doty v. State, 33 Misc.
2d 330, 226 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
28. DeMartini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 442, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 564 (1961).
1. Any person who acquires goods or services which he or his family will use
primarily for purposes other than business or capital producing is, at least in relation to such goods or services, a consumer.

